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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In products liability cases it is a common practice for a plaintiff
buyer to make several claims against a defendant seller. One common
claim arises under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"U.C.C." or the "Code") for breach of either, or both, an express or im-
plied warranty., A second claim often advanced is that the product
was delivered in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" ren-
dering the defendant strictly liable in tort for the buyer's injury.2 The
final potential claim is that the seller was negligent in the product's
manufacture, packaging, or warnings.
Which claim will prove most successful depends on the circum-
stances of each particular case. For example, if the plaintiff exper-
iences solely economic loss resulting from nonconformity in the goods,
the warranty claim would be the most likely to succeed.3 But if the
plaintiff suffers physical injury or damage to property other than the
goods in the contract resulting from a dangerous defect in manufac-
1. See infra section II for a discussion of the different types of warranty claims that
may arise and how they are treated under the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 695
(5th ed. 1984). There are numerous other theories of liability which may be in-
cluded in a products liability case depending on the facts. These include misrep-
resentation, fraud, nuisance, trespass, absolute liability, battery, admiralty, and
statutory claims. See ScoTr BALDWIN ET AL., THE PREPARATION OF A PRODUCT
LIABILITY CASE § 1.4 (2d ed. 1993).
3. See BALDWIN, supra note 2, § 4.1. A contract claim may also be subject to a longer
statute of limitations than tort claims. See id. It is interesting to note that a
breach of warranty is sometimes viewed as a form of strict liability. Like the tort
doctrine of strict liability, a claim for breach of contract does not require any
showing that the seller was negligent. All that is required is to show that the
goods did not conform to the terms of the contract. This showing is analogous to
the "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" showing that is required to
state a strict products liability claim. One commentator has compared the im-
plied warranty of merchantability and strict tort liability stating that:
[Tihe implied warranty of merchantability seems to be a hybrid of
negligence and strict liability much like section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Indeed, both section 402A and U.C.C.'s implied war-
ranty of merchantability appear to require specific proof of deviation or
malfunction, the former requiring the product be in a "defective condi-
tion" and the latter requiring the product be of "unmerchantable" qual-
ity. Perhaps the chief advantage to an injured plaintiff of the implied
warranty of merchantability action over a section 402A action is simply
that the term "merchantable" is broad enough to encompass a greater
array of product malfunctions than section 402A. Of course, these ad-
vantages may be offset by the requirement of notice, the possibility of
disclaimer, and other restrictions of warranty law.
Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the
Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1277, 1309 (1994).
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ture or design, strict liability may be the strongest claim.4 In the
event neither of these claims succeeds, the plaintiff may be required to
prove that the manufacturer negligently caused the plaintiffs loss or
injury.5
A primary purpose of the sales contract is to provide the parties to
the contract with certainty regarding their transaction: certainty that
the product will be delivered on time, certainty that it will be ac-
cepted, and certainty that it will conform to the description and war-
ranties. Sales contracts may also attempt to provide certainty
regarding the available remedies if one of the parties fails to perform
its end of the bargain.6 Therefore, it is imperative that disputes aris-
ing out of a negotiated sales contract between parties of relatively
equal bargaining power be settled by the court in accordance with the
terms of the contract.
Many commercial buyers, however, have found a way to recover
damages resulting from risks allocated to them by their sales agree-
ment. They do so by stating claims in tort. Although courts are gener-
ally opposed to this use of tort law to avoid a sales contract, they have
been inconsistent in determining the applicability of tort law to com-
mercial sales transactions. 7
Section II of this Article summarizes the provisions of the U.C.C.,
which provide a flexible medium for commercial parties to create eco-
nomically efficient sales agreements.8 Section III reviews how tort
law has provided a necessary protective function in consumer transac-
tions.9 Section IV catalogues the various ways courts have navigated
the unclear and often unfair intersection between tort law and the
U.C.C.1o Section V concludes this Article by proposing a resolution to
the question of which law should govern losses caused by defective
products and the extent to which these losses may be disclaimed."1
4. Since notice and privity are not required in tort claims, these claims may be the
most useful to the plaintiff who is not in a contractual relationship with the de-
fendant. See infra section I.
5. Negligence puts the burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant did not
exercise the appropriate standard of care. See infra section III.
6. See generally Detroit Edison Co. v. Nabco, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 242 (6th Cir. 1994)
(noting that two sophisticated commercial parties "with the warranties provided
by the U.C.C. as a baseline, could have considered the costs to each of bearing the
risk of a defective product and allocated between them, with certainty, the costs
of such risk"); Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 1975)
("In the evaluation of foreseeable commercial risks, Illinois seems to attach
greater importance to the commercial interest in certainty than to the policy of
deterring negligence.").
7. See infra section IV.
8. See infra notes 12-68 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 69-124 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 125-233 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 234-242 and accompanying text.
2000]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY UNDER SALES LAW
The warranty provisions of Article 2 allocate the risk of the seller's
nonperformance in sales transactions.' 2 They also provide buyers and
sellers with a means to redistribute this risk according to the wishes
of the interested parties. In bringing a warranty action, the buyer
must prove that (1) a warranty existed, (2) the warranty was
breached, (3) the breach of the warranty proximately caused the loss
suffered, and (4) notice of the breach was given to the seller.' 3
First, the Code imposes implied warranties that serve to maintain
commercial and industry standards and that maintain a minimum
level of product performance.' 4 Second, the parties may use express
12. See, e.g., Detroit Edison v. Nabco, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 1994) (-Mhe
UCC ... establishes a set of unified, coherent standards controlling commercial
transactions .... When a product does not live up to the requirements of the
sales contract, the UCC enables a purchaser to recover on the basis of implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability, as well as on any express warranties
created between the parties."). This section is presented as an overview of the
most pertinent Code warranty provisions. For a more complete discussion of Ar-
ticle 2 warranties, consult Debra L. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties In Com-
mercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CoRNELL L. Rav. 1159 (1987).
For a number of years, the American Law Institute and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the two organizations jointly re-
sponsible for drafting, updating, and promulgating the Uniform Commercial
Code, worked on a revision of Articles 2 and 2A. In a press release on August 18,
1999, they announced the formation of a new Drafting Committee to continue the
effort to revise Articles 2 and 2A of the U.C.C. The press release stated:
In May of this year the ALI approved revised versions of both Articles 2
and 2A that were the result of many years of collaborative effort by the
two organizations. At the annual meeting of NCCUSL in July, opposi-
tion to certain sections of Article 2, which regulates the sale of goods to
consumers and to merchants, led the leadership of NCCUSL, which has
sole responsibility for seeking enactment of UCC revisions in the state
legislatures, to conclude that the prospects for uniform adoption
throughout the country required additional review of some provisions.
Accordingly, the NCCUSL annual meeting took no action with respect to
either Article 2 or Article 2A.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, August 1999
Press Release, <httpl//www.nccusl.orgpressrel/ucc2a2.htm>. Although it cannot
be known what the final, adopted provisions of the revision to Article 2 will be,
where relevant we will refer to the proposed Revision of Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2 - Sales (Reporter's Interim Draft, November 1999). See National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Reporter's Interim Draft
(Nov. 1999), <http://www.law.upenn.edubll/ulc/ucc2/ucc21199.htm>.
13. See U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13 (1989); U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1989).
14. See U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (providing that warranties may be implied from course of
dealing or usage of trade); Goetz, supra note 12, at 1191 (noting that implied
warranty was designed to uphold commercial standards). The implied warranty
of merchantability, for instance, warrants not the highest or lowest quality in the
trade, but rather for fungible goods, it warrants that the goods will be of "fair
average quality" within the contract description. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b). For
other goods, it warrants that they will "pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description." U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a).
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warranties to impose a higher level of quality than imposed by the
implied warranties. 15 The Code also allows the parties to contractu-
ally limit or eliminate remedies available for breach of warranties.1 6
Finally, the Code provides for a disclaimer of warranties.17 The selec-
tive creation and disclaimer of warranties permit commercial parties
to treat the risk of defective goods as a commodity: the commercial
buyer, in return for a lower sales price, can choose to assume some or
all of that risk. This decision for economically sophisticated purchas-
ers should depend on whether it is able to insure against the risk at a
lower cost than the seller.1S These provisions also permit sellers to
shift some or all of the risk of defective goods to buyers. However, law
outside of the U.C.C. has developed to protect consumers from some
transfers of this risk.19
A. Creating Liability in the Seller
1. Implied Warranty
If the parties fail to address risk of nonperformance by the seller,
the Code imposes liability on the seller when it is commercially rea-
sonable to do so. The Code contains two implied warranties relating
to the quality or suitability of goods. Where the seller is a merchant,20
the Code imposes an implied warranty of merchantability.21
Merchantability in this context means that the goods must be "fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."22 The Code
15. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1989). All warranties are construed as consistent with each
other and cumulative, unless such a construction is unreasonable. See U.C.C.
§ 2-317 (1989).
16. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (1989).
17. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1989).
18. In the case of a commercial transaction, unlike the consumer transaction, both
parties are able to assess the risk of loss in the event the product is defective and
to insure against such loss. This ability allows the parties to allocate risks of loss
in the most efficient manner possible. See William K Jones, Product Defects
Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract Over Tort, 44 U. Mmin L.
REv. 731, 763-68 (1990) (noting that the buyer is often in the best position to
insure against the risk of business interruption).
19. See the Consumer Product Warranties (Magnuson-Moss) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308
(1975), which limits the ability to disclaim implied warranties in consumer trans-
actions which include written warranties, discussed infra at notes 33-38. See
also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1977) (discouraging en-
forcement of strict liability disclaimers).
20. A merchant is one "who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction." U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1989).
21. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
22. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). Section 2-314(2) sets minimum standards for
merchantability which require that goods:




also imposes an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
where the seller has reason to know that the buyer intends a specific
use for the goods and that the buyer is relying on the seller's knowl-
edge or expertise in determining the suitability of the goods for that
use.23 Thus, the warranties of fitness and merchantability implied by
the Code create a default allocation of risk of the seller's nonperform-
ance, which applies in certain situations unless the parties alter this
allocation.2 4
2. Express Warranties
The seller may, by making express warranties, assume perform-
ance obligations beyond those imposed by the Code's implied warran-
ties. An express warranty is an explicit undertaking by the seller with
respect to the quality, description, condition, or performability of the
goods. The undertaking may consist of an affirmation of fact or a
promise that relates to the goods, a description of the goods, or a sam-
ple or model of the goods.2 5 In each of these instances, the undertak-
ing must become or be made part of the basis of the bargain in order
for an express warranty to be created. 26 In recognition that the rea-
sonable buyer does not and should not rely on everything that a seller
says, the Code provides that some statements by the seller do not cre-
ate express warranties. The seller may make affirmations about the
value of goods ("puffing") without creating an express warranty that
the goods will actually have that value.2 7 Also, the seller may praise
(b) in the case of fungible goods, re of fair average quality within the
description; and...
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
U.C.C. 2-314(2).
23. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1989). The implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose is not limited to merchant transactions. See U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 4.
24. See infra section II.B.
25. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1); see also Goetz, supra note 12, at 1171-72 (noting that the
affirmations and descriptions may be made in a number of ways, including "ad-
vertisement, brochure, written sales contract, owner's manual, repairs logbook,
or oral representation").
26. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1).
27. See U.C.C. § 2-313(2); see also Carpenter v. Alberto Culver Co., 184 N.W.2d 547,
549 (Mich. App. 1970) ("Representations which merely express the seller's opin-
ion, belief, judgment, or estimate do not constitute a warranty."). The creation of
an express warranty by a seller's statement may turn on the specificity of the
statement. See Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The
line between puffing and warranting is often difficult to draw, but the more spe-
cific the statement the more likely it constitutes a warranty.").
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the goods without creating an express warranty.28 However, it is not
the case that the seller must intend for an express warranty to be cre-
ated.2 9 It is only necessary that, from an objective point of view, an
affirmation, description, or sample becomes part of the "basis of the
bargain."30 While "basis of the bargain" has not been well defined, it
relates to whether a reasonable person would believe and rely upon
the seller's statement and whether the statement was expressed
merely as opinion.3 1 Where a buyer can show that affirmations other-
wise within the scope of the Code's express warranty provision were
made and were reasonably believable, such affirmations are rebut-
tably presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain.3 2
B. Removing Liability from the Seller: Disclaimers
The seller's performance obligations may be limited by the use of
disclaimers. For the buyer's protection, however, the Code imposes
some restrictions on the seller's ability to disclaim warranties in a
sales contract. The Code severely constrains the seller's ability to dis-
claim express warranties.3 3 Furthermore, the Code seeks to ensure
that the buyer is aware of disclaimers affecting implied warranties.
To this end, a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability
must use the term "merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous."3 4 Additionally, the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose may only be disclaimed by a conspicuous writing.3 5
Moreover, if the seller wishes to disclaim all implied warranties, it
must use "language which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is
no implied warranty."3 6 The Code directs that the language "as is" or
"with all faults" will have this effect. 37 Finally, course of dealing or
usage of trade may exclude an implied warranty.3s
28. See Carpenter, 184 N.W.2d at 549.
29. See U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
30. WnLmi D. HAwKLAND, UNIrFoMf COMMERCIAL CODE SERIEs § 2:313:2 (1984).
31. See id. § 2-313:3. The official comment to the U.C.C. § 2-313 mentions that, in
practice, no particular reliance is required to be shown in order to make affirma-
tions of fact part of the agreement because such affirmations become part of the
description of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3; see also Goetz, supra note 12,
at 1173-84 (discussing the various judicial approaches to the basis of the bargain
element of express warranty creation).
32. See HAwKLAND, supra note 30, § 2-313:5.
33. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1). This section is a rule of interpretation that gives priority
to language creating an express warranty over language tending to negate that
warranty.
34. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
35. See id.
36. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
37. Id.
38. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).
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In addition, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,39 in the sale
of consumer goods a seller who makes a written warranty cannot dis-
claim any implied warranty.40 The Act defines consumer goods as
"tangible personal property... normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes."41
C. Procedural Limitations on Seller Liability
In addition to contractual disclaimers, the Code places a number of
procedural limitations on warranty liability. First, if the buyer ref-
uses the seller's demand to inspect the goods, then defects that should
have been discovered by such inspection are outside of any implied
warranty.42 Second, the buyer must notify the seller within "a reason-
able time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
. . . ."43 Third, the buyer must be in privity with the seller.44 Where
goods are purchased through an intermediary, the buyer's privity with
the seller comes into question. Section 2-318 gives the states three
options in determining who will be a third party beneficiary of the
seller's warranties to the original buyer. 4 5 In addition, some courts
have extended the protection of express warranties to parties not in
privity.4
6
In addition to these requirements to state a cause of action for
breach of warranty, the U.C.C. contains a four-year period of limita-
tions after the cause of action has accrued.47 However, "the parties
39. 15 U.S.CA_ § 2301 et seq. (1998).
40. See id. at § 2308 (permitting an implied warranty to be limited to the duration of
a written warranty, provided that such limitation is reasonable, conscionable,
and conspicuously displayed).
41. Id. at § 2301.
42. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
43. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
44. See U.C.C. § 2-318.
45. See id. There are three alternative privity provisions available to the states. Al-
ternative A is the most restricted and limits the benefit of seller's warranties to
natural persons in the buyer's household who may reasonably be expected to use
consume or be affected by the goods, provided that such natural person suffers
personal injury. See id. Alternative B removes the requirement that the person
be in the buyer's household. See id. Alternative C broadly extends protection "to
any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods." Id. For a more complete discussion of the three alternative provisions of
U.C.C. § 2-318 see William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Insti-
tuted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Com-
mercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1215, 1228-33 (1993).
46. See Fullerton Aircraft Sales v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 842 F.2d 717, 722 (4th Cir.
1988); Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (10th
Cir. 1984); Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkdll Feed & Fertilizer, 633 F.2d 155, 160 (9th
Cir. 1980).
47. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1989). Where necessary to protect consumers, some courts
have held that the statute of limitations applicable to an action for breach of im-
plied warranty is that applicable to tort actions. See Hanson v. American Motors
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may reduce the period of limitation to a period of not less than one
year ... ."48 Under normal circumstances, the cause of action accrues
at the time of delivery. Where a contract warrants future perform-
ance, however, the period of limitation begins to run at the time "the
breach is or should have been discovered."49 Thus, the Code's provi-
sion for limitations of actions also allows the allocation of risk to be
based on time of discovery. In the absence of contractual modification,
the buyer assumes the risk of a defect that is not discovered within
four years of delivery. If the parties desire a shorter period of limita-
tion, they may expressly shorten the period-but cannot shorten it to
less than one year. Although the period may not be expressly length-
ened, the buyer can negotiate for a longer period by asking for war-
ranty language that addresses future performance.5 0
D. Remedies for Breach of Warranty
If the goods do not conform to the warranties provided under a
sales contract, the Code allows the buyer to recover compensatory
damages resulting "in the ordinary course of events from the seller's
breach."5' Unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount, the measure of damages for breach of warranty is
the difference between the value of the non-conforming goods and the
value they would have had if they had conformed to the warranty.5 2
Where appropriate, incidental and consequential damages also may
be recovered.53 Incidental damages include reasonable expenses re-
sulting from the breach of warranty, such as those incurred in inspec-
tion, transportation and custody of rejected goods and in effecting
cover for the defective goods.54
Consequential damages may be recovered for "(a) any loss result-
ing from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of war-
Corp., 269 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Mich. App. 1978) (holding that tort statute of limita-
tions would apply if "the cause of action arose out of the breach of an implied
warranty" but § 2-725 would apply where the injury resulted from the breach of
an express warranty). But see Rothe v. Ford Motor Co., 531 F. Supp. 189, 194
(N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that § 2-725 applied to actions for breach of express and
implied warranties and specifically rejecting prior case law that had applied tort
statute of limitations to actions for breach of implied warranties).
48. U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
49. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
50. See Jones, supra note 18, at 745.
51. U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (1989).
52. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
53. See U.C.C. § 2-714(3).
54. See U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1989).
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ranty."5 5 The first category of consequential damages refers to pure
economic loss, such as lost profits and spoilage of work-in-progress.
Recovery in this category is restricted to losses that are both unavoid-
able and foreseeable.5 6 The second category of consequential damage
permits recovery for personal injury and damage to property other
than the product itself.57
In order to recover for breach of warranty, the buyer must prove
the extent of its losses; however, the degree of certainty to which
losses must be shown is deliberately left open by the Code.5 8 The
drafters of the Code intended that damages could be proven by any
means reasonable under the circumstances. 59
E. Contractual Limitation of Remedies for Breach of
Warranty
Just as the Code allows the parties to a contract to allocate the
costs caused by defective goods, the Code also permits the parties to
determine what remedies should be available for a breach of the war-
ranties provided. The Code permits the parties to create by explicit
agreement remedies in addition to or instead of those provided in the
Code and may limit or change the measure of damages recoverable in
the event of breach.6 0 However, if the court determines that an exclu-
sive remedy provision fails its essential purpose, the court may grant
other Code remedies as appropriate.Si Moreover, any limitation or ex-
clusion of consequential damages that is unconscionable will not be
enforceable. 6 2
Under section 2-718, "[dlamages for breach by either party may be
liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasona-
ble in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility
of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."6 3 While the provision
expressly invalidates unreasonably large liquidated damages as a
55. U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
56. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a). Professor Jones observes that foreseeability has been of
very little "decisional significance" since it is not required that the seller could
have anticipated the particular losses incurred if the product was used for its
intended purpose. See Jones, supra note 18, at 744.
57. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b).
58. See U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 4.
59. See id.
60. See U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (1989). This power is subject to the provisions of section 2-
718 on liquidation of damages. Where the agreement does not explicitly refer to
the contractual remedy as exclusive, then it merely creates an optional remedy,
which may be sought as an alternative to other Code remedies.
61. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
62. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
63. U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
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penalty for breach, it is conspicuously silent on the matter of unrea-
sonably small liquidated damages provisions.6 4
The Official Comment to section 2-718 notes that unreasonably
small amounts of liquidated damages may be attacked as "unconscion-
able."6 5 In the event that the buyer raises such a claim, however, the
seller must be given a reasonable opportunity to rebut the claim by
offering evidence as to the purpose, effect, and commercial setting of
the limitation clause.6 6 These Code provisions direct the court to ex-
amine contract provisions limiting or eliminating remedies for breach
of warranty in the context of the entire sales contract. 67 Because it is
very difficult to show unconscionability in a commercial setting,6 8 the
Code, in effect, sanctions knowledgeable parties to use freely the limi-
tation or exclusion of remedies as additional dimensions in their bar-
gaining process.
III. TORT LAW AND CONSUMERS
In 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors69 and Dean Prosser wrote his landmark
article urging an "assault on the citadel" of products liability law.70
Since that time, the law of products liability has undergone rapid and
significant evolution.71 Products liability has indeed become one of
64. See id.
65. U.C.C. § 2-718 cmt. 1.
66. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1989); see, e.g., Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation,
Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that a provision excluding air-
plane manufacturer's liability for late delivery of a new type of airplane was not
unconscionable).
67. Commentators have noted that the factors considered in determining unconscio-
nability fall into procedural and substantive categories. See JAZEs J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUAtIERS, UNIFORM COMItERCIAL CODE 132-159 (4th ed. 1995). Proce-
dural factors involve the relative bargaining power of the parties and include age,
education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, who drafted the con-
tract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alterations
in the printed terms were possible, and whether there were alternate sources of
supply for the goods in question. The substantive category examines the contrac-
tual terms and requires a determination of whether they were commercially rea-
sonable. Usually courts balance these factors, requiring a certain level of both
substantive and procedural unconscionability to reach a determination that the
contractual provision is unconscionable. See id. at 150.
68. The general rule is that unconscionability is exceptional in commercial settings.
This rule "applies to the unconscionability of any contract provision, including
limitations of general damages." Tharalson Co. v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 728 F.2d
1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 1984).
69. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). Henningsen is regarded as the leading case imposing
strict products liability. See KEETON, supra note 2, § 97.
70. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
71. See generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966). For a survey of the status of strict liability in each of the fifty states, see
John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a
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the most significant areas of commercial law. Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, holds the sellers of defective products
strictly liable, allowing "consumers" and "users" to receive compensa-
tion for injuries caused by these products. 72 An examination of the
origins of the strict liability doctrine, however, reveals that it was not
designed to be applied in certain commercial settings.
The doctrine of strict products liability contained in section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts is more practical for the protection
of consumers who are injured by a defective product than is the con-
tractual law of warranty. This is because consumers are usually not in
a position to bargain with a manufacturer for adequate protection
from dangerous defects in products or remedies for injuries caused by
them. Also, the contractual requirements of privity between the par-
ties and notice to the manufacturer of the defectiveness of the product
essentially bar many consumer causes of action from being based on a
warranty theory. Section 402A eliminates these problems, holding a
manufacturer strictly liable when a defective product it places in the
stream of commerce injures a consumer.
Historically, a consumer who was injured by a defective product
could only look to the law of warranty and negligence as a remedy for
injuries sustained. Privity of contract was a required element in a
products liability action.7 3 If there was no privity of contract between
the parties, the injured party might be without a remedy.74 Even if a
defendant was guilty of affirmative negligence in performing a con-
tract, a third party who was not in privity of contract with the defen-
dant could not seek a judgment against him.75 This doctrine was
followed for many years. It was even applied in cases where a manu-
facturer negligently manufactured a product that foreseeably caused
"New Cloth"for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the
States Reveals A Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493, 559-590 (1996).
72. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402(A) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
73. See Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 138 S.E.2d 753, 754 (N.C. 1964).
74. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. Pl. 1842).
75. See id.
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harm to a citizen with whom the manufacturer had no privity of
contract.7 6
The other available remedy was based on a contract warranty the-
ory. If the seller gave the purchaser an express warranty that the
product failed to achieve, the purchaser had a remedy. If there was no
express warranty from the retailer, the purchaser could sometimes re-
cover on the basis of an implied warranty, because goods were re-
quired to meet a minimal expectation of quality and safety. In earlier
periods, the courts followed a motto of caveat emptor; let the buyer
beware. Courts eventually rejected this idea and held that a warranty
was implicit in a sale of goods. This concept has been codified in the
Uniform Commercial Code, which states that goods must be "fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."77 This stan-
dard applies to the seller of any goods.
Because implied warranty was a contract theory, it had all of the
advantages and disadvantages of a contract. While the seller was sub-
ject to strict liability if a product did not meet the standard of fitness
for ordinary purposes, the seller was only liable to the purchaser who
was in privity of contract with him. Thus, the manufacturer was not
liable unless he sold the product directly to the purchaser. Third per-
sons who did not purchase the product, but were injured by it, could
only recover under negligence theory.
Eventually, exceptions to the privity requirement began to develop.
One court held that the privity rule did not bar recovery in cases in-
volving imminent danger to consumers.7 8 Imminent danger occurred
when death or great bodily harm would be "the natural and almost
inevitable consequence" of the negligence of the manufacturer.7 9 This
exception was further developed in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.80
Judge Cardozo wrote the majority opinion, which held:
[Tihe principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives,
and things of like nature, to things which in their normal operation are imple-
ments of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing
of danger .... If [the manufacturer] is negligent where danger is to be fore-
seen, a liability will follow. 8 1
This opinion changed the "imminent danger" test into a test of
whether the danger was foreseeable.8 2 Liability under this exception
76. See Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
77. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
78. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
79. Id. at 408.
80. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).




was not limited to buyers of products, but applied to all persons who
could reasonably be foreseen to use the product.8 3
In 1960, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,84 a landmark decision that changed the ex-
isting law applied to defective products. The case involved a defective
automobile that crashed and caused property damage to the car and
personal injuries to the driver, the owner's wife. The court held that
when a manufacturer puts a product into the stream of trade and pro-
motes its purchase to the public, "an implied warranty that it is rea-
sonably suitable for use . . .accompanies it into the hands of the
ultimate purchaser."8 5 By extending a warranty of safety to consum-
ers of all products in this way, the court removed the obstacle of priv-
ity from all cases involving a defective product that causes physical
injury.86
The California Supreme Court took this idea one step further in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.8 7 by severing strict products
liability from the restrictions of warranty theory and completely elimi-
nating the privity problem. It held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being."8 8 The court recognized that in
cases of dangerous products, courts applying strict liability had, in the
past, circumvented the privity requirement by basing recovery on the
theory of express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer
to the plaintiff.8 9 The court reasoned that it no longer made sense for
such liability to be governed by the law of contract warranties, but
should instead be controlled by the law of strict liability in tort.90 Cit-
ing Henningsen, the court reached this conclusion based on the aban-
donment of the requirement of privity between the parties, the
recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but im-
posed by law and the unwillingness to permit manufacturers to define
the scope of their own responsibility for defective products. 9 ' This
rule has since been broadly accepted.9 2
83. See also Champlin v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 918, 922 (10' Cir.
1959) (extending the same reasoning).
84. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
85. Id. at 84.
86. See id.; see also Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J.
1985) (holding the same).
87. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
88. Id. at 900.
89. See id. at 901.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr. Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 248-49 (Alaska
1969); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 436, 191 N.W.2d 601, 606-07
(1971); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Okla. 1974); Rit-
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Shortly after the Greenman decision, the American Law Institute
included a new section, 402A, captioned "Special Liability of Seller of
Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer," in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.93 Section 402A imposes strict liability on sellers of
defective products that cause injury to consumers and eliminates priv-
ity requirements. 94 The comments to that section make clear that it is
not governed by the warranty provisions of the U.C.C.95 The section
limits claims to those involving physical harm, either personal injury
or property damage. This limitation is based on sound policy reasons.
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern economic re-
lations between buyers and sellers.96 While warranty rules may make
it difficult to be compensated for physical injury, they function well in
a commercial setting.97 They determine the "quality of the product the
manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he must
deliver."9 8
In addition, strict products liability has often been applauded as
advancing several public policy goals. Indeed, Justice Roger Traynor,
in the first significant opinion suggesting strict liability for product
defects, argued:
public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effec-
tively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot ....
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business.9 9
Justice Traynor also advanced the proposition that strict liability
is justified because the injured person is in a poor position to identify
negligence on the manufacturer's part.10 0 These two reasons became
the recognized rationales for imposition of strict liability in Greenman
v. Yuba Power:1 0 ' "[tihe purpose of such liability is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."1 0 2 As
ter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 263 (R.I. 1971); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.
v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
94. See id.
95. See id. at § 402A cmt. m.
96. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ill. 1982).
97. See id. at 447.
98. Id.
99. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
100. See id. at 441.
101. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1965).
102. Id. at 901.
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these concepts have evolved, they have been further parsed out into
"loss spreading or compensation, risk shifting, incentives to safety,
and cost internalization."' 0 3 These reasons rest on the desirability of
safer products and the protection of unwary consumers.1 0 4 The con-
cept of business liability has fully shifted from negligence to strict lia-
bility under the auspices of providing better distribution of risk and
loss between the manufacturer and the unwary consumer.1 0 5
Such analysis has not been without its detractors. Criticisms of
Justice Traynor's rationale have ranged from an empirical study sug-
gesting little safety improvement from strict liabilityO6 to a proposi-
tion that this expanded liability actually decreases safety.107 For the
purposes of this article, however, we will assume the legitimacy of
Justice Traynor's justifications for strict products liability.108 Al-
though these grounds for strict liability are all firmly rooted in the
consumer sphere, we must evaluate those claims in a commercial set-
ting to see what result, if any, would occur if strict liability was aban-
doned between entities of roughly equal bargaining power.
The justifications for imposition of strict liability revolve around
the safety of the product. But is "safety" a concept that can be readily
defined in a strict liability regime? Safety is not an absolute, i.e., prod-
ucts do not fit neatly into either "safe" or "unsafe." Such propositions
create "mischief," assuming that "perfect safety is both technologically
feasible and normatively desirable."l0 9 Principles of negligence thus
become the proper measuring stick of safety. Judge Learned Hand's
decision in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 11o exemplifies how a
court may apply risk-utility analysis to find an optimal level of care
based on the situation. One commentator has identified negligence as
"the ideal standard for product design responsibility."'11 Addition-
ally, the Restatement (Third) of Torts endorses use of the negligence
concept in determining safe product design, even though its applica-
tion is through the eyes of "strict liability."112 If safety is already be-
103. Anita Bernstein, How Can A Product Be Liable?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1995).
104. See id.
105. See Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources,
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 140, 141 (1994).
106. See GEORGE L. PRIEST, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABI-
ITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 222 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds.,
1988).
107. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Man-
agement in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 307-29 (1985).
108. Traynor's views on the benefits of strict liability continue to be recognized, not-
withstanding the harsh criticism from all sides.
109. David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 754.
110. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
111. See Owen, supra note 109, at 754.
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a.
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ing evaluated in terms of negligence, the impact of the removal of
strict liability in a commercial setting should have no effect.
Strict liability principles are appropriate when the parties in the
transaction are not familiar with each other or lack the knowledge
necessary to bargain adequately. They may be inefficient, however,
when the parties are knowledgeable and can bargain for the appropri-
ate remedy. In situations where the buyer has sufficient knowledge
and bargaining power, warranties become the most efficient way to
allocate loss and provide safety.1 ' 3 This is because the parties to a
particular transaction are in the best position to evaluate the costs
and benefits of the items being purchased. Warranties allow the par-
ties to set their own equation in the risk-utility analysis, creating less
need for judicial intervention in the event of a breach. Parties will
find themselves in a better position to allocate risks and spread losses
because they will know the result of the risk-utility formula without
worrying over what level would have been judicially set.
Safety will not diminish either. Both parties will be more aware of
their responsibilities in the area of safety because they will have allo-
cated those duties without later intervention, judicial or otherwise, be-
ing necessary. The guessing game behind the optimal level of duty
becomes resolved as each party is aware of their responsibility as it is
allocated by the warranty provision.
Of course, these proposals do have limitations. For example, they
are only applicable to cases involving two commercial entities of
roughly equal bargaining power. The bargaining power requirement,
as expanded below, prevents a powerful seller from forcing an unsafe
(or "less safe," given the discussion above) product on a weak buyer.
Warranties between two equal powers should allow for the proper al-
location of risk between the two. In addition, these proposals do not
address third parties that are not privy to the contract. Such parties
injured by the product would still be free to sue the manufacturer
under negligence and strict liability theories. This provides at least a
certain minimum degree of safety, regardless of the persuasiveness of
the above arguments. Abandoning strict liability would only have a
meaningful effect on allocation of loss due to damage to the property
itself, damage to other property, and pure economic loss.
Another concern of the courts has been preserving the ability of
consumers to bring actions against manufacturers. The U.C.C. "ex-
plicitly relates to actions 'for breach of any contract for sale' and pre-
sumably was not intended to apply to tort actions between consumers
and manufacturers who were never in any commercial relationship or
setting."114 The U.C.C. includes some requirements that may pose
113. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
114. Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 238 A.2d 169, 176 (N.J. 1968).
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considerable obstacles to a buyer's recovery. For example, the buyer
may not be able to recover under contract law because of a lack of
privity with the manufacturer.115 Also, the requirement of notice to a
seller of a breach of warranty may bar recovery.1 6 The second arises
from the seller's ability to limit or disclaim liability to an innocent pur-
chaser. "A buyer who does not deal directly with a manufacturer can-
not negotiate over the terms of a disclaimer and might find it
impossible to give the manufacturer notice of the breach of warranty
following an injury."1' 7
It has been held that strict liability cannot be contractually dis-
claimed in the consumer context.ns Allowing manufacturers to dis-
claim strict liability to consumers would allow them to define the
scope of responsibility for harm caused by their products."i 9 Strict
liability circumvents these technical requirements of privity, notice,
and limitation of damages.120 Avoiding these requirements is espe-
cially important for the injured party who is outside the distribution
chain for the product.121
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides that
"[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to lia-
bility for harm to persons or property caused by the defect."122 A ma-
jor change in the Restatement (Third) from 402A in the Restatement
(Second) is the separation of rules covering manufacturing defects
from defective designs and inadequate warnings or instructions.
These changes are not relevant to the issues discussed herein.
The concept of strict products liability was created "to insure that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."123 This
cost-shifting rationale protects individual consumers in two ways. It
not only provides a fair distribution of the costs of the injuries caused
by defective products; it also provides a strong incentive for companies
to insure the safety of their products before the products are placed on
115. See Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 668 (N.J.
1985).
116. See U.C.C. §2-607(3) (1989).
117. Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 668.
118. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150 (Cal. 1965).
119. See id.
120. See id. at 148-49.
121. See id. at 149.
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LLABILrrY § 1 (1998).
123. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
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the market.1 24 But how should courts apply strict liability outside of
the consumer sphere it was designed to protect? Section IV examines
the paths courts have taken in applying strict liability to commercial
transactions.
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SALES AND TORT LAW
REGARDING LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
As previously discussed, two distinct bodies of law have evolved
both of which apply to defective products. The first, sales law, is stat-
utorily created and contractually based. The second is judicially cre-
ated and tort-based. Because both bodies of law can apply to the same
transaction, 125 conflicts between the two causes of actions have inevi-
tably arisen. Given that the purposes and historical antecedents of
each differ in a number of respects, the conflicting approaches have
not proven readily reconcilable.
In this article we are concerned with a significant subset of these
conflicts. First, should strict liability in tort apply to commercial
transactions involving two business entities? Second, if the answer to
the first question is yes, in such a transaction should a seller's dis-
claimer of liability for defective products be effective? Third, what
types of damages caused by defective products should be recoverable
under strict liability in torts? Courts have struggled with these three
issues and, more generally, with the role of strict liability in purely
commercial transactions where a defective product has caused a loss
to a merchant-buyer. 126 We will now examine their varied and incon-
sistent approaches.
A. Does Strict Liability Apply to Commercial Transactions?
The great majority of courts apply strict liability in tort to commer-
cial transactions. 127 The California courts, however, have held that
strict liability is not applicable to commercial transactions between
parties of equal bargaining power who can fairly allocate any risk of
loss between them. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric
124. See Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 219 (4th Cir. 1982)
(stating that strict liability "provides manufacturers with a disincentive to mar-
ket unreasonably dangerous products").
125. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1977).
126. One court noted that "[t]he rule of strict liability for defective products is an ex-
ample of necessary paternalism judicially shifting risk of loss .... Judicial pater-
nalism is to loss shifting what garlic is to a stew-sometimes necessary to give
full flavor to statutory law, always distinctly noticeable in its result, overwhelm-
ingly counterproductive if excessive, and never an end in itself." Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (Ct. App. 1976).
127. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 149-183.
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Corp.,128 the California Court of Appeals adopted a four-prong test to
determine if a party could recover under strict liability.129 The court
held "that the doctrine of products liability does not apply as between
parties who: (1) deal in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of rela-
tively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the specifications of the
product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in
it ."130
The court reasoned that the principles and rules governing war-
ranties were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions,
while products liability law was designed to address situations in
which the principles of sales warranties serve their purpose "fitfully at
best."131 Wherever the U.C.C. and contract law sufficiently serve
their purpose to protect a party's rights, there is no need to resort to
tort law.13 2 For transactions meeting all four factors enunciated by
the court, the U.C.C. is deemed to provide the exclusive remedy.
The next California case dealing with this issue was Scandinavian
Airlines System v. United Aircraft Corp.,' 33 in which the Ninth Circuit
fully deferred to the opinion in Kaiser Steel. The court held that the
doctrine of strict liability in tort was not available to the plaintiff,34
stating:
Interpreting these four requirements as the court did in Kaiser leads us to the
conclusion that SAS does not have a claim in strict tort liability against
United. SAS, United and McDonnell Douglas dealt in a commercial setting
from positions of relatively equal economic strength. The specifications of the
engines were negotiated by the parties. Finally, McDonnell Douglas, United
and SAS all negotiated the risk of loss for defects in the engines.
1 3 5
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,
quoting its holding that the doctrine of strict liability is not applicable
because of the "lack of public policy for such a position."'3 6 Strict lia-
bility is based on a policy "designed to protect the small consumer and
to allocate the risk of loss [from a defective product] to the person most
able to bear it... the manufacturer."' 3 7 There is no policy reason for
a manufacturer to be subject to strict liability when the buyer is also a
large commercial entity.138
128. 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1976).
129. See id. at 845; see also Aris Helicopters Ltd. v. Allison Gas Turbine, 932 F.2d 825
(9th Cir. 1991) (following the California approach).
130. Kaiser Steel, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
131. Id. at 844.
132. See id.
133. 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
134. See id. at 429.
135. Id.
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Subsequent decisions have slightly modified the four Kaiser Steel
requirements.139 In S. Empresa, etc. v. Boeing Co.,140 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit eliminated the third re-
quirement-bargaining for the product's specifications. The court
stated that a reading of the previous line of cases applying the test
"indicates that bargaining the specifications of the product is not cru-
cial to the conclusion that strict liability does not apply."'141 The court
went on to echo the trial court in Scandinavian, which emphasized
that the primary policy behind strict liability in tort is to protect the
individual buyer and is not applicable to situations in which the par-
ties can negotiate the risk of loss with equal force.142 The court held
that so long as the other three requirements of the Kaiser test are met,
strict liability does not apply, even if the parties did not actually nego-
tiate the specifications of the product.'4 3
In International Knights of Wine v. Nave Pierson Winery Inc.,144
the California Court of Appeals further refined the Kaiser test. The
court placed the greatest emphasis on a party's bargaining power and
reversed a lower court's ruling that section 402A was inappropriate to
the cause of action.' 4 5 The court stated that strict liability is "in-
tended to operate in favor of any person or entity, corporate or other-
wise, having no significant bargaining power respecting the
manufacturing process and which is thereby best calculated to be its
victin."14 6 The court further stated that the fourth Kaiser require-
ment - negotiating the risk of loss - could be satisfied if a party had
the "ability to negotiate respecting risk of loss from a defective prod-
uct."'147 It concluded that it should be necessary to show only that the
party seeking to recover under strict liability could have negotiated
the risk of loss, rather than requiring proof of actual negotiation.' 48
139. See S-. Empresa, etc. v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981); International
Knights of Wine v. Nave Pierson Winery Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 301 (Ct. App. 1980).
But see Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 175 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75
(Ct. App. 1981) (stating that all of the enumerated criteria in Kaiser must be
present to preclude the application of products liability).
140. 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981).
141. Id. at 754.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. 168 Cal. Rptr. 301 (Ct. App. 1980).
145. See id. at 304.
146. Id. at 303.
147. Id. at 304.
148. See id. at 304 n.1.
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B. Are Disclaimers of Liability in Commercial Transactions
Effective Under Strict Liability in Tort?
A number of courtsX49 as well as several commentators'5 0 have re-
acted to this issue by holding that section 402A liability can be dis-
claimed in commercial transactions.i5 i Other courts have rejected
this approach. Two 1974 cases define the general positions courts
take with respect to disclaimers. In Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmo-
tive, Inc.,15 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that a party could not disclaim strict tort liability in a commercial
transaction. Shortly thereafter, in Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J.
Enstrom Corp.,'5 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that such a disclaimer may be effective if it is negotiated
between parties of relatively equal bargaining strength and is clearly
expressed in the contract.
In Sterner, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that since strict products
liability is based in tort law, not contract, contractual disclaimers are
ineffective in removing manufacturers' liability.154 The Tenth Circuit
observed that one of the reasons for abandoning the concept of implied
warranty in sales law in favor of strict liability in tort was that con-
tractual defenses, such as disclaimers, caused "complexity as well as
injustice."' 55 The Tenth Circuit also noted that "[tlhe Oklahoma Su-
preme Court [had previously] decided that traditional concepts of con-
tract law are inapplicable in Manufacturers' Products Liability cases.
149. See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 927-28
(9th Cir. 1979) (predicting that the Idaho Supreme Court would follow the major-
ity rule allowing disclaimers of strict products liability in commercial transac-
tions); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149-51
(3d Cir. 1974) (remanding for a determination of whether a waiver of strict liabil-
ity was clearly expressed and therefore effective); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1974) (following Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Ct. App. 1965) and holding that
strict liability disclaimers between aircraft manufacturers and airlines can be
effective).
150. See Michael B. Metzger, Disclaimers, Limitations of Remedy, and Third Parties,
48 U. CiN. L. REV. 663, 668-72 (1979) (noting that courts uphold disclaimers
where both parties are sophisticated commercial parties); Morris G. Shanker, A
Reexamination of Prosser's Products Liability Crossword Game: The Strict or
Stricter Liability of Commercial Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
550, 566-67 (1979); Elliot M. Kroll, Aviation Products: Commercial Disclaimers,
682 INs. L.J. 615, 629 (1979); William J. McNichols, Who Says That Strict Tort
Disclaimers Can Never Be Effective? The Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REv.
494, 529 (1975).
151. These authorities have reached this conclusion despite the drafters' comment
that the "consumer's cause of action.., is not affected by any disclaimer or other
agreement." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) of ToRTS § 402A cmt. m (1977).
152. 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974) (applying Oklahoma law).
153. 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) (predicting Pennsylvania law).
154. See Sterner, 499 F.2d at 713.
155. Id. at 712.
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We construe this as precluding the defendants from asserting the exis-
tence of a contractual disclaimer provision as a valid defense to liabil-
ity."156 For further support of its holding, the Tenth Circuit quoted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
The basis of liability... is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales
Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties .... The
consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract
with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by
any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his
immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the con-
sumer's hands. 1 5
7
At least one federal district court has taken the Tenth Circuit's po-
sition. In Florida Steel Corp. v. Whiting Corp.,'5 8 the court held that
contractual disclaimers cannot be enforced in strict liability tort ac-
tions regardless of the parties' bargaining power. The district court
noted that the cases supporting enforcement of disclaimers were
based on the rationale that large commercial entities can "protect
themselves from getting a 'bad bargain', and that only individual con-
sumers need protections against contractual defenses such as dis-
claimers."'15 9 The district court stated that the Florida Supreme
Court, in adopting 402A, emphasized that more was at stake than the
benefit of the bargain,160 recognizing that "as a matter of public pol-
icy, rather than of contractual understanding, a duty should be placed
on manufacturers to 'warrant' the safety of their products."161 Be-
cause this duty is based on public policy, the district court held that it
cannot be disclaimed even in commercial transactions.162
The strong position against disclaimers adopted in Sterner is not
universally accepted. Some courts have endeavored to forge tests
based on bargaining power to determine whether a disclaimer of strict
liability between commercial parties is valid. For example, in Key-
stone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp.,163 the Third Circuit
focused on the nature of the parties' bargaining process in determin-
ing whether Pennsylvania law allowed a contractual disclaimer of
strict tort liability. The court noted that "[a] social policy aimed at
protecting the average consumer" need not apply to business deal-
ings.164 In the court's opinion, transactions between business entities
marked by fair and effective bargaining should be influenced more by
the Uniform Commercial Code, which allows disclaimers, than by the
156. Id. at 713.
157. Id. at 713 n.2 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1977)).
158. 677 F. Supp. 1140 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (predicting Florida law).




163. 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
164. Id. at 149.
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consumer-oriented 402A.165 The court concluded that despite Com-
ment m and Pennsylvania's tendency to adopt comments to the Re-
statement, "Pennsylvania law does permit a freely negotiated and
clearly expressed waiver of sec. 402A between business entities of rel-
atively equal bargaining strength" 66 where the four prerequisites of
Pennsylvania exculpatory clauses law are met: "(1) Such clauses must
be strictly construed; (2) With every intendment against the party
who seeks immunity from liability; (3) The contract must spell out the
intention of the parties with the greatest of particularity; and (4) The
burden [of proof] is upon the party asserting the immunity."' 67
Using this analysis, the Keystone court found that the disclaimer at
issue was not sufficiently explicit to disclaim 402A liability.168 Subse-
quent federal cases applying Pennsylvania law are in accord with Key-
stone, holding that 402A liability may be disclaimed as long as the
disclaimer is (1) freely negotiated between parties of equal bargaining
power and (2) clearly expressed.' 69
Other courts, while adopting the Keystone result that strict liabil-
ity in tort may be disclaimed, have significantly modified its require-
ments. The Supreme Court of Oregon diluted both the "negotiated"
and "equal bargaining power" elements of the first Keystone require-
ment in K-Lines Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co.170 This case involved a de-
fective truck and a disclaimer of liability signed by the purchaser. The
purchaser argued that the contractual limitation of liability was inva-
lid because the parties had not negotiated it and the parties did not
have equal bargaining power.' 7 ' The court held that actual negotia-
tion between parties is not essential to the validity of a limitation of
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 150 (citing Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Bus. Men's
Ass'n, 224 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. 1966)).
168. See Keystone, 499 F.2d at 150. Keystone involved the purchase of two used heli-
copters by Keystone from R.J. Enstrom Corporation. The agreement for the sale
of the first helicopter stated that the warranty expressed therein, which provided
that the manufacturer's obligation would be limited to replacement of defective
parts, was "in lieu of all other warranties and 'all other obligations and liability,
direct or consequential.'" Id. at 147-48 (quoting the Warranty).
The second purchase agreement contained the following two provisions: (1)
"'[clustomer takes as is without warranty of any kind except Enstrom will convey
good title'" and (2) "Warranty Exclusions. The R.J. Enstrom Corporation will be
held harmless of any liability in connection with this sale. Sale of these helicop-
ters is unconditional and no warranty of any kind is made or implied.'" Id. at 148
(quoting the Purchase Agreement).
169. See Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1976);
Thermo King Corp. v. Strick Corp., 467 F. Supp. 75, 79 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Ebasco
Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163, 223-24 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
170. 541 P.2d 1378 (Or. 1975).
171. See id. at 1380.
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402A liability. The court stated that "[t]he plaintiff apparently be-
lieves that there must be explicit evidence that there were offers and
counter-offers on the limitation terms or comparable evidence of 'hag-
gling'. We do not believe such evidence is necessary."' 7 2 The court
went on to hold that the true standard by which limitation of liability
clauses should be judged is whether they were "a part of the parties'
bargain in fact."173 The court stated:
If [the limitation of liability] is contained in a printed clause which was not
conspicuous or brought to the buyer's attention, the seller had no reasonable
expectation that the buyer understood that his remedies were being restricted
to repair and replacement. As such, the clause cannot be said to be a part of
the bargain (or agreement) of the parties. 174
Conversely, if the buyer was made aware of the clause, then it would
seem to pass the court's test for "negotiated."
The court also held that it had not been established that the par-
ties did not have equal bargaining power, stating:
As to unequal bargaining power between the parties, we are of the opinion
also that as a matter of law that has not been shown. Disparity in bargaining
power does not exist when the only evidence is that the buyer is a truck line
purchasing five trucks for $93,000 and the other contracting parties are a
truck manufacturer and a truck distributor. That one party may possess
greater financial resources than the other is not proof that such a disparity of
bargaining power exists that a limitation of liability provisions [sic] should be
voided.1 75
This approach places the burden of proof on the party adversely
affected by the disclaimer to demonstrate that there was not equal
bargaining power between the parties; otherwise the clause is valid.
This modification, although subtle, gives the disclaiming party a sig-
nificant advantage. The Keystone approach takes the opposite posi-
tion by invalidating an exculpatory clause unless the disclaiming
party shows that it was freely entered into between parties of equal
bargaining power.176
Courts have also differed in their interpretations of Keystone's
clear language requirement. In Keystone, the disclaimer was disal-
lowed as ambiguous, and the case was remanded for more evidence
regarding the parties' intent.1 77 Other courts, however, have upheld
172. Id. at 1384.
173. Id. (quoting ROBERT J. NonDsTROm, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF SALEs § 89 at 207
(1970)).
174. K-Lines, 541 P.2d at 1384.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
177. See Keystone, 499 F.2d at 149-51. One disclaimer read that the given warranty
was "in lieu of all other warranties and 'all other obligations and liability, direct
or consequential.'" Id. at 147-48 (quoting the Warranty). The other disclaimer,
relevant to the helicopter that crashed, stated that the buyer took "as is," and
that "'[tihe R.J. Enstrom Corporation will be held harmless of any liability in
connection with this sale. Sale ... is unconditional and no warranty of any kind
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disclaimers using very similar language, holding that the party's in-
tention to exculpate itself was clearly expressed.' 7 8 For example, in
Thermo King Corp. v. Strick Corp. 179 a disclaimer using languageiSO
very similar to the disclaimer in Keystone was allowed. The court
found the following language to be sufficiently different to distinguish
it from the Keystone disclaimer: "'The Manufacturer is not responsi-
ble, and will not be held liable, for special, indirect, or consequential
damages, including injury or damage caused to trailers, contents,
product cargo or persons, by reason of the installation of any Thermo
King product or its mechanical failure.'"1 8 1
On the other hand, a clause very similar to that in Thermo King
was disallowed by the court in Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insur-
ance Co.182 as void for vagueness. The clause in Mead stated:
"Our liability is in all cases limited as provided in these Conditions and does
not extend to consequential damages, either direct or indirect, nor to expenses
for repairs or replacements or otherwise, paid or incurred without our author-
ity. We accept no liability for defects or depreciation caused by damage in
transit, faulty erection, wear and tear, accidents, lightning, dampness, neg-
lect, misuse or other abnormal conditions, due directly or indirectly to circum-
stances beyond our control." 1 8 3
Thus, courts differ considerably in allowing disclaimers of strict li-
ability in tort. Some disallow them in all circumstances. Others allow
them under varying requirements dealing with the nature of the par-
ties and the clarity of the disclaimer itself. Even among courts per-
mitting disclaimers, there is considerable conflict in how they apply
the clear language requirement.
is made or implied.'" Id. at 148 (quoting the Purchase Agreement). Apparently,
it was the second clause that was the primary point of contention in Keystone. See
id. at 150.
178. Examples of language that has been considered sufficient include: "'[tihe forego-
ing shall be Buyer's sole and exclusive remedy whether in contract, tort or other-
wise, and Kenworth shall not be liable for injuries to persons or property.'" K-
Lines, 541 P.2d at 1380 (quoting the Warranty and Owners Service Policy). Simi-
lar language was used in a provision which stated that Westinghouse's liability
"'whether in contract, in tort, under any warranty, or otherwise, ... shall not
exceed the price of the product or part on which such liability is based.'" Idaho
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924,925 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting
a price quotation).
179. 467 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law).
180. The disclaimer negated all U.C.C. warranties and then stated that the warranty
given was to supplant "'all other liabilities and obligations on the manufacturer's
part.'" Id. at 78 (quoting the Warranty Card).
181. Id. at 79 (quoting Thermo King's express warranty).
182. 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (applying Ohio law).
183. Id. at 362 (quoting the limitations of liability clause).
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C. What Damages are Recoverable Under Strict Liability in
Torts?
The resolution of the third issue can avoid the need to resolve the
first two issues. Many courts have resolved the issue of 402A liability
in commercial transactions by denying recovery for economic loss.184
The possible categories of recoverable damages for defective products
were well elaborated in Sioux City Community School District v. Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph Corp.15 where the federal district
court stated:
Courts and commentators have delineated at least four distinct categories of
harm which could be held recoverable under the theory of strict liability in
tort for defective products: (1) physical injury to persons; (2) physical damage
to tangible things other than the product itself, (3) physical damage to the
product itself; and (4) commercial or economic losses which involve no physical
harm but which are occasioned by the unfitness of the product.18 6
Courts generally hold that the first two categories may be recov-
ered under strict liability in tort.187 A strong majority of courts do not
allow any recovery under strict liability in tort for the third cate-
gory.18 All but a handful of courts deny recovery in strict liability in
torts for the fourth category.1 8 9
Although the great majority of courts allow recovery for damage to
other property, some jurisdictions limit the recovery of damage to
"other property." They treat damage to other property as an economic
loss where such damage was foreseeable or within the contemplation
184. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-76
(1986); Laurens Elec. Coop. v. Altec Indus., 889 F.2d 1323, 1324-26 (4th Cir.
1989); Livermore Amador Valley Wastewater Management Agency v. Northwest
Pipe and Casing Co., 915 F. Supp. 1066, 1069-71 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Chemtrol Ad-
hesives, Inc. v. American Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co., 537 N.E.2d 624, 628-35 (Ohio
1989); Continental Ins. v. Page Eng'g Co., 783 P.2d 641, 647-50 (Wyo. 1989). See
also cases cited in RESTATEMENT (THIR) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LiAsLrrv § 21, Re-
porters' note to cmt. d (1997).
185. 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
186. Id. at 664. The district court proceeded to rule that under Iowa tort law, the first
two categories of damages are clearly recoverable, while the latter two are not.
See id at 664-65. The court, however, noted two possible exceptions to this rule:
(1) the parties are of unequal economic strength or (2) plaintiff seeks recovery in
addition to economic loss. See id. at 665.
187. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-76
(1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151-52 (Cal. 1965); Spring Motors
Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663-72 (N.J. 1985); Bocre Leasing
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1195-99 (N.Y. 1995). See also
cases cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21, Report-
ers' note to cmt. d (1997).
188. See cases cited supra note 187.
189. See Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992); Iacono v.
Anderson Concrete Corp., 326 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ohio 1975); Berg v. General
Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818, 822-25 (Wash. 1976); City of LaCrosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 240 N.W.2d 124, 127-28 (Wis. 1976).
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of the parties. In Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc.,190 dairy
farmers brought negligence and products liability actions against the
designers and sellers of allegedly defective milking machines seeking
damages for decreased milk production and medical problems exper-
ienced by their cows. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed sum-
mary judgment for the defendants holding that the farmers sought
recovery for just economic loss and thus their only remedy was in war-
ranty under the U.C.C.i9i The court reasoned that "[in many cases,
failure of the product to perform as expected will necessarily cause
damage to other property; such damage is often not beyond the con-
templation of the parties to the agreement."1 92 Therefore, parties
could negotiate such damage and it is more appropriately called eco-
nomic loss. The court found that both farmers knew the risk of dis-
ease associated with a poorly designed milking machine and so the
recovery sought was deemed economic loss.193
Some courts have focused more on the knowledge and experience of
the parties. In Hapka v. Paquin Farms,J94 the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota held that where a transaction is "commercial," that is between
merchants, the U.C.C. provides the buyer's exclusive remedy for dam-
age to other property. Hapka involved diseased seed potatoes that
harmed the rest of the buyer's potatoes.' 95 The court found that par-
ties were both knowledgeable dealers in the trade of seed potatoes and
were of relatively equal bargaining power and therefore the buyer's
only remedy was the U.C.C.196
In Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc.,J9 7 decided two years
later, a defective dental chair allegedly started a fire that destroyed
the building in which the buyer maintained his office. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that, where the buyer was not a merchant
dealing in the goods, the economic loss doctrine does not preclude him
from suing in tort as well as in contract for damage to other prop-
erty.198 The reasoning, in short, was that the non-merchant buyer
lacked the bargaining status of the buyer in a commercial transaction
and therefore "should be allowed a 'panoply' of legal remeies."' 99
Turning to the third category, East River Steamship Corp. v. Tran-
samerica Delaval, Inc.2 00 is the leading case holding that damage to a
190. 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992).
191. See id. at 623.
192. Id. at 620.
193. See id. at 620-21.
194. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 688.
197. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
198. See id. at 15.
199. Id. (citing Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688).
200. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
[Vol. 79:215
THE APPLICABILITY OF TORT LAW
defective product itself, with no personal injury or damage to "other"
property, is "purely economic" and cannot be recovered under 402A by
a party in a commercial relationship. In this case, the United States
Supreme Court noted that no matter how the harm occurs, the result-
ing repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits interfere only with
the benefit of the bargain, and accordingly, these losses are properly
redressed under contract law.2O1 The Court reasoned that these
losses are all insurable.20 2 Therefore, the Court concluded that since
warranty law is sufficient to protect the purchaser in obtaining the
benefit of its bargain, the public cost of holding a manufacturer re-
sponsible in such cases is not justified.203
The Texas Supreme Court has also held that mere economic loss is
not recoverable under a theory of strict liability in tort. In Mid Conti-
nent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc.,204 the
court cited Dean Keeton to elucidate the rationale behind the eco-
nomic loss doctrine:
"A distinction should be made between the type of 'dangerous condition' that
causes damage only to the product itself and the type that is dangerous to
other property or persons. A hazardous product that has harmed something or
someone can be labeled as part of the accident problem; tort law seeks to pro-
tect against this type of harm through allocation of risk. In contrast, a damag-
ing event that harms only the product should be treated as irrelevant to policy
considerations directing liability placement in tort. Consequently, if a defect
causes damage limited solely to the property, recovery should be available, if
at all, on a contract-warranty theory."2 0 5
The court noted that damage to a defective product is essentially a
purchaser's loss of the benefit of the bargain with the seller. All the
purchaser really loses is the cost of repairs and use of the product;
nothing outside of his transaction with the seller.2 06 It stated that
"[iun transactions between a commercial seller and commercial buyer,
when no physical injury has occurred to persons or other property,
injury to the defective product itself is an economic loss governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code."2 07
Other courts have taken a different approach to the issue by look-
ing at the manner in which the harm to the defective property oc-
curred. These courts hold that damage to the defective product itself
may be recovered if it is caused by an unreasonably dangerous de-
fect.2 0s They reason that the purpose of strict liability is to provide an
201. See id. at 870-71.
202. See id. at 871-72.
203. See id. at 872.
204. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
205. Id. at 312 (quoting W. Page Keeton, Torts, 32 SW. L.J. 1, 5 (1978)).
206. See Mid Continent, 572 S.W.2d at 313.
207. Id.
208. See Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984); Mor-
ris v. Osmore Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. App. 1995).
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incentive to design, manufacture, and distribute safe products and,
because parties are not expected to bargain for their safety, contract
law is not well suited to deal with hazardous defects. The following
cases illustrate this line of reasoning.
In Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,209
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals used the unreasonably dangerous
distinction to determine whether tort or contract law applied to the
question of recovery for damage to the defective product itself. In
Pennsylvania Glass, a defective front-end loader caught fire and was
destroyed. Although the defect did not cause the fire, it did prevent
the fire from being extinguished because the machine was not
equipped with a necessary safety device. The court held that damage
to a defective product may be recovered under 402A if the defect, as in
this case, was unreasonably dangerous.210 The court distinguished
this type of defect from a "qualitative" one which "renders a product
inferior or unable adequately to perform its intended function."2 11 Ac-
cording to the court, such qualitative defects are best dealt with under
the principles of warranty and contract law because they deal with the
buyer's disappointed expectations. 21 2 On the other hand, hazardous
defects are best handled through tort law, which imposes a duty on
manufacturers to produce safe products, regardless of the defect's ulti-
mate impact. 2 13 The court stated that:
[Tihe line between tort and contract must be drawn by analyzing interrelated
factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in
which the injury arose. These factors bear directly on whether the safety-in-
surance policy of tort law or the expectation-bargain protection policy of war-
ranty law is most applicable to a particular claim.
2 1 4
Previously, in Posttape Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co.,215 the
same court held that the plaintiff could not recover for damages to the
product itself, commercial film that had a scratched surface and thus
was useless, because the product was not a threat to person or tangi-
ble property. The product was defective and "did not perform as ex-
pected," but in no way could it be considered "unreasonably
dangerous."21 6 The court acknowledged the "superiority" of 402A in
protecting the average consumer from personal injury or property
damage, but went on to say that it is not as appropriate when there is
a commercial setting and the damages are "consequential and arise
209. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
210. See id. at 1174-76.
211. Id. at 1172.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 1172-73.
214. Id. at 1173.
215. 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976).
216. Id. at 755.
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from a non-dangerous impairment of quality of the product."217
Where a defect affects the quality, but not the safety, of a product, the
U.C.C. is the proper authority for determining liability.218
The Supreme Court of Arizona used the "unreasonably dangerous"
distinction in Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power
District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.219 The court held that a three
factor test should be used to determine whether tort or contract law
should be applied: (1) the nature of the defect (dangerous v. qualita-
five); (2) the manner in which the loss occurred (sudden accident v.
gradual deterioration); and (3) the type of loss (personal injury, dam-
age to "other" property, damage to the defective product, and economic
loss).220 The court indicated that the factors need to be weighed to-
gether on a case by case basis.221 Damage to the defective product
itself is not recoverable under 402A if it occurs due to a slow, non-
dangerous deterioration. 22 2 If the damage occurred in a sudden acci-
dent caused by a dangerous defect, however, the balance would be
tipped "in favor of strict tort liability even though the damage fortui-
tously was confined to the product itself."223 The court stated that if
there is no potential for danger to person or property, there is no need
to resort to the safety incentives of tort law.2 24
A few courts have taken a minority view that all damages, even
economic, can be recovered in strict liability actions. 2 25 The leading
case adopting this viewpoint was Santor v. A & M Karagheusian.22 6
In Santor, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a consumer
could recover in strict liability against a manufacturer, even though
the only damages were economic harm. The court reasoned that the
policy underlying strict liability was a cost-shifting one that requires
that the manufacturer bear the costs of defective products it places on
the market. The court made no distinction between personal injury or
property damage and economic loss.2 2 7 In the 1997 case ofAlloway v.
General Marine Industries, L.P.,228 however, the New Jersey Supreme
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984).
220. See id. at 206.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 209.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 207.
225. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Lakeshore, Inc, 753 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985); Cova v.
Harley Davidson Motor Co., 182 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); Iacono v. An-
derson Concrete Corp., 42 326 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1975); Berg v. General Motors
Corp., 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder &
Assocs., Inc., 240 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 1976).
226. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
227. See id. at 312.
228. 695 A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997).
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Court sharply limited Santor. In this case, the court held that a con-
sumer purchaser of a power boat that sunk because of a defect could
not recover under strict liability in tort for the economic loss resulting
from a defect that caused injury only to the boat itself.229 The court
noted that in this case it was not required to resolve (1) the issue of
whether tort or contract law applies to a product that poses a risk of
causing personal injuries or property damage but has caused only eco-
nomic loss to the product itself nor (2) the issue of whether a strict
liability claim is precluded when the parties are of unequal bargaining
power, the product is a necessity, no alternative source for the product
is readily available, and the purchaser cannot reasonably insure
against consequential damages.230
As previously mentioned,231 the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability distinguishes between liability for harm to persons
or property from economic loss. Section 1 only applies to the former
and not the latter.232 In addition, section 18 provides that disclaimers
are not effective in reducing "claims against sellers or other distribu-
tors of new products for harm to persons."233
V. A PROPOSAL FOR WHAT LAW GOVERNS LOSS IN
SALES CONTRACTS
As discussed in this Article, courts have taken dramatically differ-
ent approaches in applying strict liability in tort to the commercial
setting. It is the central purpose of this Article to propose a clear and
sensible approach to this tort-contract dilemma while protecting justi-
fied expectations of the parties and minimizing occasions for disputes.
This proposal has been guided by the following principles:
1. Where appropriate, the parties should be permitted to allocate
risks.
2. Contract/sales law best addresses risk allocations.
3. Transactions should be subject to either tort law or contract law,
but not to both.
4. Where risk allocation is not appropriate, tort law should govern
exclusively.
5. Allocation of risk of injury to the person is never appropriate.
The fundamental thrust of the proposal is to extend the protection
of tort law to consumer buyers while withholding it from commercial
buyers. The proposal also distinguishes between "bargaining commer-
cial buyers" and "non-bargaining commercial buyers" by granting to
"bargaining buyers" greater latitude to disclaim warranties. In recog-
229. See id. at 275.
230. See id. at 273.
231. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LLABiLITY § 1.
233. Id. at § 18 cmt. a.
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nition that not all commercial buyers have the ability or the bargain-
ing power to negotiate on an equal footing with manufacturers or
distributors, this proposal affords the non-bargaining commercial
buyer the protection of a more "disclaimer-proof" implied warranty of
merchantability. See Table I at the end of this article.
A. Consumers
A consumer purchaser is a one who buys consumer goods. We
adopt the definition under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of con-
sumer goods: "tangible personal property normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes." 23 4 Our proposal would make the
U.C.C. inapplicable to consumer purchasers with respect to personal
injury and damage to other property caused by defective products.
The consumer purchaser would have recourse against the seller only
under tort law.23 5 The consumer's right of recovery under strict liabil-
ity in tort would not be affected by any disclaimer, limitations of liabil-
ity, or any contractual provision allocating loss. This proposal is
driven by two of the principles mentioned above: (1) that where risk
allocation is not appropriate, tort law should govern exclusively and
(2) that allocation of risk of injury to the person is never appropriate.
By not allowing disclaimers of damage to other property caused by
the defective product, our proposal goes further than the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which provides that disclaimers
can not effectively reduce or bar claims for harm to persons.2 36 Our
proposal reflects the rationale advanced by the new Restatement: "It
is presumed that the ordinary product user or consumer lacks suffi-
cient information and bargaining power to execute a fair contractual
limitation of rights to recover."23 7 We consider this presumption suffi-
ciently broad to extend also to damage to other property caused by the
defective product.
When a consumer incurs commercial loss resulting from defective
goods, the U.C.C. would apply exclusively. We propose, however, that
the Magnuson-Moss Act's limitations on disclaiming implied warran-
ties be extended to all sales of consumer goods not just those in which
the seller gives a written warranty.
234. The Interim Draft of the Revised Article 2 similarly defines a "consumer" as "an
individual who buys or contracts to buy goods that, at the time of contracting, are
intended by the individual to be used primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes." U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(10) (Interim Draft, November 1999).
235. This proposal is only appropriate in states that have adopted § 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts or Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
236. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRm: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 18.
237. Id. § 18 cmt. a.
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B. Non-Bargaining Commercial Buyers
This Article proposes that the option to resort to tort law should
not be granted to commercial buyers2 38 (non-consumers) for damage
to other property and commercial loss. Tort law, however, would gov-
ern personal injury caused by defective products, even if sustained by
the non-bargaining purchaser himself. Because some commercial
buyers to do not have sufficient bargaining power to negotiate an
agreement that protects their interests, this proposal provides that
such non-bargaining commercial buyers be given the protection of a
non-disclaimable implied warranty of merchantability with respect to
damage to other property caused by the defective product. Our propo-
sal imposes an implied warranty of merchantability with respect to
commercial loss that presumptively may not be disclaimed. A court
may enforce such a disclaimer if the court finds as a matter of law that
the disclaimer meets Article 2's definition of good faith applicable to
merchants. This definition provides that "good faith" in the case of
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."23 9 These limita-
tions on the seller's ability to disclaim the implied warranty of
merchantability should achieve the policy goals of strict liability by
providing protection from disclaimers for a relatively weak commer-
cial buyer yet subjecting the transaction to the U.C.C.
The buyer would have the burden of showing unequal bargaining
power by proving one of two factors:
(1) that the buyer could not have bargained the specifications of the
product; or
(2) that the buyer could not have negotiated the risk of loss from
defects.
Each of these factors is a question of fact. To satisfy the first factor
the buyer would have to establish that it lacked either the opportunity
or the ability to bargain the specifications of the product.
C. Bargaining Commercial Buyers
As in the preceding section, commercial buyers who have the op-
portunity to bargain over the products would not receive the protec-
tion of 402A with respect to damage to other property and commercial
loss. The Uniform Commercial Code and its warranty provisions
would exclusively govern such losses. Moreover, these warranties
would be fully disclaimable to the extent now allowed by law. This
238. This distinction is not the same as the merchant test under the U.C.C. § 2-104.
"Commercial buyer" is a broader class than "merchant," since the heightened
knowledge and dealings requirements would not have to be met to show that
strict liability was inapplicable.
239. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
[Vol. 79:215
THE APPLICABILITY OF TORT LAW
result would preserve the ability of commercial entities to bargain
over all aspects of the product, without giving the buyer unfair lever-
age through 402A. Tort law, however, would govern personal injury
caused by defective products, even if sustained by the bargaining pur-
chaser himself. Our proposal would permit the parties to agree to a
hold harmless clause requiring the buyer to indemnify the seller for
any products liability claims asserted by third parties against the
seller.
So what benefits does eliminating strict liability in a commercial
setting confer? We have already seen that safety would not be af-
fected.2 40 And abolishing strict liability
may be significant, even in circumstances in which the parties are said to be
free to reallocate risks, if in practice courts adopt hostile attitudes towards
contractual provisions that seek to achieve just such a reallocation. Business
uncertainties could be reduced, and the relevant issues could be more sharply
focused, if commercial buyers were compelled to rely exclusively on the con-
tract remedies of the U.C.C.241
When two parties are on roughly equal footing, they are in a posi-
tion to determine which risks to assume and how costs will be allo-
cated. Allowing the contracted terms of the individual agreement to
guide the resolution of conflict is "almost certainly superior in terms of
both fairness and efficiency" to judicial intervention. 24 2
D. Conclusion
We believe that our proposal would resolve many of the conflicting
issues arising from the overlapping applicability of tort and contract
law to liability for defective products. Given that these two legal areas
have disparate policy objectives, it is not surprising that they have
evolved inconsistent principles. For this reason, we have concluded
that only one of them should apply to any single transaction. This
approach reduces confusion, thereby protecting the parties' justified
expectations, facilitating private ordering, and minimi ing occasions
for dispute. At the same time, we recognize that the law has an obli-
gation to protect individuals from overreaching and their own improv-
idence, and to safeguard the interests of third parties to contracts. In
determining whether tort or contract law should apply, we balanced
freedom of contract against the need to protect parties not fully able to
do so themselves. We believe that our proposal represents a reasona-
ble and feasible resolution of these competing values. Moreover, we
consider our proposal an improvement over the current state of the
law.
240. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
241. Jones, supra note 18, at 758.
242. Jones, supra note 18, at 798.
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Table I: Proposal for What Law Governs Loss in Sales Contracts
Purchaser Personal Injury Other Property Commercial Loss









Bargaining Tort law applies;
Commercial No disclaimers
permitted;
Hold harmless
clauses permitted
Tort law applies;
No disclaimers
permitted
UCC applies;
No disclaimer of
merchantability
permitted
UCC applies;
Disclaimers
permitted
UCC applies;
No disclaimers
permitted
UCC applies;
Rebuttable
presumption against
disclaimer of
merchantability
UCC applies;
Disclaimers
permitted
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